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Abstract. We give an intuitive formal definition of untraceability in
the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model, inspired by existing definitions
of anonymity. We show how to verify whether communication proto-
cols satisfy the untraceability property and apply our methods to known
RFID protocols. We show a previously unknown attack on a published
RFID protocol and use our framework to prove that the protocol is not
untraceable.
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1 Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems aim to identify tags to readers in
an open environment. Communication between readers and tags is even possible
when there is no physical or visual contact between tags and readers. RFID tags
can be very small and cheap [1] and can therefore be embedded in a wide variety
of objects. They have, for instance, been embedded in passports [2] and there
are plans to embed them in bank notes [3] and groceries [4, 5].
The absence of physical contact during communication and the expected
ubiquity of RFID systems will only encourage nefarious entities to trace and
observe tags through time and space. If at any such point a tag is linked to a
person, the tracing of a tag becomes the tracing of a person.
The need for RFID protocols to be resistant against this kind of attack on
privacy has been realized early on. Intuitively, protocols are said to provide un-
traceability, if an adversary is not able to recognize a tag he previously observed.
Although untraceability is mainly mentioned in the context of RFID systems, it
is an issue for any protocol which is used with a mobile device. In the Bluetooth
setting, it is known as location privacy [6, 7].
History has shown that designing protocols is a difficult and error-prone task
and that formal verification of security properties is necessary [8, 9]. While tradi-
tional security properties such as authentication and secrecy have been studied
thoroughly, untraceability has only become relevant with the introduction of
travelling devices. Until now it has typically been treated rather informally. In
some cases, protocol designers prove untraceability of their protocols without
even defining it properly.
In this paper, we propose an intuitive, formal definition for untraceability
that is inspired by existing definitions for anonymity [10, 11]. We demonstrate
the usability of our definition on two protocols. In particular, we prove that the
mutual authentication protocol by Feldhofer, Dominikus, and Wolkerstorfer [12]
is untraceable and that the Di Pietro and Molva protocol [13] is untraceable
only for a restricted choice of parameters and assuming that their constructed
function, DPM , is a perfect hash function. By removing the assumptions and
analyzing the algebraic properties of the DPM function we demonstrate the
first, efficient method to trace tags running the Di Pietro-Molva protocol. We
then relate this insight back to our definition of untraceability by exhibiting a
trace of the protocol which violates our definition.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss related
work. In Section 3 we formally define untraceability. In Section 4 we prove the
Feldhofer et. al. protocol untraceable and in Section 5 we discuss the Di Pietro-
Molva protocol. We conclude with an outlook on future work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
A discussion of the importance of untraceability can be found in [14–18]. Sev-
eral RFID protocols have been proposed with informal reasoning about their
untraceability property [19–22] or based on the belief that protocols with ran-
dom nonces in all messages are untraceable [23–25]. On the opposite end of the
spectrum, pseudonyms and frequent changes of IDs are claimed to be neces-
sary to avoid the tracking problem [26–29]. Among the cryptographic notions of
untraceability, worth mentioning are [30–36].
The notion of untraceability defined in this paper is stronger than the notions
considered in [37, 38] in the following sense. These works consider RFID tags
which an adversary could recognize between any two successful communications
with a trusted RFID reader to be untraceable, while under the present definition
they are not.
The untraceability notion considered here is only weakly related to the un-
linkability notion that has been studied extensively in privacy enhancing tech-
nologies (PET) literature. A formal definition for unlinkability was given in [39,
40]. Unlinkability considers whether links can be established between senders
and receivers, while untraceability considers whether different communications
can be attributed to the same agent. It is difficult to give a precise relation
between anonymity and untraceability due to the many differing definitions of
anonymity [10, 11, 41]. In general however, untraceability implies anonymity.
Security properties such as secrecy and authentication, implemented by a
protocol at a certain layer, are maintained in the lower layers. However, for
untraceability, the property can be compromised by the protocols in the lower
layer [42]. In this paper, we will focus on untraceability in the application layer.
3 Definitions
3.1 Security Protocol Model
The purpose of this section is to introduce basic notation and definitions concern-
ing security protocols. Rather than providing a full description of security proto-
col syntax and semantics, we will only present the basic requirements needed for
defining and analyzing untraceability. In short, we require that the behavior of
a number of agents executing a security protocol is described by a set of traces
in which we can identify the events belonging to the same run. A full semantics
satisfying our requirements can be found in [43].
The starting point is the specification of a security protocol. A security pro-
tocol defines the behavior of a set of roles (e.g. initiator, responder, server). A
role specification consists of a sequence of events (e.g. the sending or reception
of a message). The messages contained in the events are role terms. Role terms
are built from basic role terms, such as nonces (typically denoted by n), role
names (e.g. R or T ), or keys (typically denoted by k). Complex terms can be
constructed using functions, such as tupling (denoted by (t1, . . . , tn)), encryption
({t}k), hashing (h(t)), and exclusive or (denoted by ⊕). Throughout this paper
we will use Message Sequence Charts to present security protocol specifications
(see e.g. Figure 1 in Section 4). In such a diagram, we use a hexagon at the end
of a role specification to denote a security claim, such as untraceability.
A role specification is only a blueprint of some actual behavior. It serves as
the program that an agent (typically denoted by Alice or Bob) can execute. An
execution of a role R specified by a protocol P is called a run of R. Such a run
will be denoted by R#θ, where θ is a (unique) run identifier. A run can thus be
viewed as an instantiation of a role. Therefore, we will also have to instantiate
the abstract role events, yielding the run events. Run events are constructed
from role events by instantiating the contained role terms. An instantiated role
term is a run term. Run terms are similar to role terms, except that roles are
replaced by agents and that basic role terms are suffixed with the identifier of
the run. An instantiated nonce n is denoted by n#θ if it occurs in run R#θ. In
this way occurrences of the same nonce in different runs can be distinguished.
We assume a standard Dolev-Yao adversary, characterized by its knowledge.
This knowledge consists of the set of run terms that the adversary initially knows,
extended with the terms obtained by observing the runs. We assume that the
adversary has unlimited inference capabilities, meaning that he can combine
the information in his knowledge to construct or interpret new terms. However,
this capability is restricted due to the assumption of perfect cryptography. This
means that the adversary cannot reverse hash functions and that he is not able
to learn the contents of an encrypted term, unless he knows the decryption
key. We denote the inference of term t from term set M by M ⊢ t. We model
corrupted agents by assuming that all secrets of these agents (e.g. secret keys)
are contained in the initial knowledge of the adversary. When evaluating security
claims, we will only be interested in claims made by trusted (i.e. non-corrupt)
agents.
Finally, we assume that the behavior of a collection of agents executing a
security protocol is given as a set of traces. Each trace consists of a number of
interleaved runs or run prefixes. A run prefix occurs if an agent cannot finish
his execution of a role specification (e.g. because the expected input is never
provided). We assume that within a trace t the events belonging to run R#θ
can be identified. Let tR#θ denote the subtrace of t consisting of the events of
run (or run prefix) R#θ which are observable by the adversary. We enumerate all
non-empty subtraces tR#θ according to the occurrence of their first observable
event in trace t. The i-th such subtrace is denoted by tRi . The agent executing
the events in this subtrace is denoted by agent(tRi ).
3.2 Untraceability
We define untraceability as a trace property of a role in a protocol. Informally,
a role is called untraceable if for every instantiation of the role which is linked
to another instantiation of the role, there is a trace that is indistinguishable to
the adversary, in which the two instantiations are not linked.
We will first define linkability, reinterpretation, and indistinguishability be-
fore presenting the definition of untraceability.
Definition 1 (linkability of subtraces). Two subtraces tRi and t
R
j are linked,
denoted by L(tRi , t
R
j ), if they are instantiated by the same agent:
L(tRi , t
R
j ) ≡ (agent(t
R
i ) = agent(t
R
j )).
The notion of reinterpretation has been introduced in [10]. It will be used
to express that subterms of a message can be substituted by other terms if the
adversary is not able to read (or interpret) these subterms. All terms that the
adversary can interpret remain unchanged.
Definition 2 (reinterpretation). A map π from run terms to run terms is
called a reinterpretation under knowledge set M if it and its inverse π−1 satisfy
the following conditions:
π(m) = m if m is a basic run term
π(m) = (π(m1), . . . , π(mn)) if m = (m1, . . . ,mn) is an n-tuple
π({m}k) = {π(m)}k if M ⊢ k
−1
or M ⊢ m ∧M ⊢ k
π(f(m)) = f(π(m)) if M ⊢ m
or f is not a hash function.
Note that the condition π(f(m)) = f(π(m)), when f is not a hash function,
leads to an under-approximation of the intended notion of reinterpretation. This
means that for certain functions f , there might be untraceable protocols which
cannot be proven to be untraceable. In such cases, the condition would need to
be refined based on the specific properties of such a function.
Reinterpretations generalize in the obvious way to traces. We use reinterpre-
tations to define indistinguishability of traces. Two traces are indistinguishable
to the adversary, if the adversary cannot see any meaningful difference between
the two traces, based on the knowledge he has.
Definition 3 (indistinguishability of traces). Let M be the adversary’s
knowledge at the end of trace t. The trace t is indistinguishable from a trace t′,
denoted by t ∼ t′, if there is a reinterpretation π under M , such that π(tRi ) = t
′R
i
for all roles R and subtraces tRi .
We now have all ingredients to formally define untraceability. Untraceability
is the property that for every trace of a protocol in which two subtraces are
linked, there is a trace that is indistinguishable to the adversary in which these
two subtraces are not linked.
Definition 4 (untraceability). A protocol P is untraceable with respect to role
R if
∀t∈Traces(P )
∀i6=jL(t
R
i , t
R
j )⇒
∃t′∈Traces(P )t ∼ t
′ ∧ ¬L(t′Ri , t
′R
j ).
4 An Untraceable Protocol
In [12], Feldhofer et al. present an AES hardware implementation for RFID tags
along with two simple protocols for unilateral and mutual authentication, of
which the unilateral authentication protocol can be proven traceable. In this
section, we prove that the mutual authentication protocol is untraceable.
4.1 Protocol Description
The protocol assumes that every pair of reader R and tag T shares a unique key
k(R, T ). These shared keys are initially not part of the adversary’s knowledge.
The reader initiates the protocol by sending a freshly generated nonce nr to the
tag. The tag generates a nonce nt encrypts the pair (nr, nt) under the shared key
k(R, T ), and sends it to the reader. The reader decrypts the message using the
same shared key, reverses the order of the two nonces, encrypts the message under
the shared key, and sends it to the tag. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation
of the protocol specification.
4.2 Untraceability
Theorem 1. The protocol depicted in Figure 1 is untraceable.
Proof. We notice first that k(R, T ) and nt remain secret throughout the protocol
execution. This can be easily verified by hand or with an automated tool.
k(R,T )
R
k(R, T )
T
nonce nr
nr
nonce nt
{nr, nt}k(R,T )
{nt, nr}k(R,T )
UNTRAC
Fig. 1. An untraceable mutual authentication protocol.
Let t be a trace with subtraces tTi and t
T
j for i 6= j. We need to show that
whenever L(tTi , t
T
j ) we can find a trace t
′ ∼ t such that ¬L(t′Ti , t
′T
j ). For ease of
notation, we set agent(tTi ) = agent(t
T
j ) = agent(t
′T
i ) = Alice and agent(t
′T
j ) =
Bob. The general idea of the proof is that t′ can be constructed from t by
replacing all occurrences of Alice in tTj by Bob. We will make this more precise
below and motivate that the adversary cannot distinguish between t and t′.
Since we are verifying the untraceability claim for an agent in role T , we may
assume that the agent is trusted, i.e. that it executes all read and send events
according to the specification. By definition, there is a θ such that the subtrace
tTj contains the event where {nr#θ, nt#θ}k(R#θ,T#θ) is sent.
We consider the map π with the following properties:
π({x, nt#θ}k(y,Alice)) = {x, nt#θ}k(y,Bob) for any x and y,
π({nt#θ, x}k(y,Alice)) = {nt#θ, x}k(y,Bob) for any x and y,
π(m) = m elsewhere.
Note that π is a reinterpretation under the adversary’s knowledge, by Defi-
nition 2 and secrecy of k(R, T ).
Let t′ = π(t). We show that t′ is a valid trace. The only difference between the
traces t and t′ occurs in messages containing the nonce nt#θ. By construction,
the changes produce a valid run for Bob while keeping the reader’s run valid. It
follows from the secrecy of nt and k(R, T ) that any further occurrence of nt#θ
must be in {nr#θ, nt#θ}k(R#θ,T#θ) or {nt#θ, nr#θ}k(R#θ,T#θ). Since nr#θ
is produced by R#θ, no other run of R will accept the former message, and
similarly, since nt#θ is produced by T#θ, no other run of T will accept the
latter message.
Finally, tTi = t
′T
i thus ¬L(t
′T
i , t
′T
j ).
⊓⊔
5 A Traceable Protocol
Di Pietro andMolva describe in [13] an identification and authentication protocol
aimed at enhancing the security and privacy of RFID-based systems. We will
first describe the Di Pietro-Molva protocol and then prove it untraceable for a
restricted choice of parameters and the assumption that Di Pietro and Molva’s
DPM function is a perfect hash function. By lifting the restrictions and analyzing
the algebraic properties of the DPM function we will demonstrate an efficient
method to trace tags and discuss its practicality. Finally, we will relate the insight
back to our definition of untraceability by exhibiting a trace of the Di Pietro-
Molva protocol for which there is no valid, to the adversary indistinguishable,
trace with unlinked subtraces.
5.1 Protocol Description
Let h be a cryptographic hash function, M , the majority function of three bits,
defined by
M : F32 → F2
(a, b, c) 7→ ac+ bc+ ab
and for ℓ ∈ 3N,
DPM : Fℓ2 → F2
(x1, . . . , xℓ) 7→
ℓ/3∑
i=1
M(x3i−2, x3i−1, x3i).
It is easy to verify that the functions M and DPM are identical to the corre-
sponding functions in [13], except that we have defined them over vector spaces
over the finite field with two elements instead of bit strings. In the remainder of
this section we will identify elements in vector spaces over F2 with bit strings.
We will denote the tags’ and readers’ unique ids by IDT and IDR, respectively.
Every tag has a unique key kT assigned to it by the key distribution center
(KDC). A reader authorized to identify a tag T will be given by the KDC the
key kT,R = h(kT , IDR, kT ). The keys are ℓ bits long.
The Di Pietro-Molva protocol, depicted in Figure 2, begins with the reader
sending its ID and a random nonce nj to the tag. The tag replies with the message
α1, . . . , αq, V, ω, where αi = kT,R ⊕ ri for randomly chosen ri (an ℓ-bit vector),
the i-th bit of V (a q-bit vector) is DPM(ri), and ω = h(kT,R, nj , r1, kT,R). The
reader has a database of keys kT,R. The reader can find the key kT,R with the
help of the vectors αi and values DPM (ri) by iterating through all possible keys.
It is expected that each αi reduces the number of possible keys by approximately
one half. ω can be used to uniquely identify the correct key. The last message of
the protocol allows the tag to authenticate the reader.
IDT , IDR, kT,R
R
kT
T
nonce nj
IDR, nj
kT,R = h(kT , IDR, kT )
nonce r1, . . . , rq
αi = kT,R ⊕ ri
V = DPM(r1), · · · ,DPM(rq)
ω = h(kT,R, nj, r1, kT,R)
α1, . . . , αq, V, ω
find kT,R
h(kT,R, r1, kT,R)
auth untrac
Fig. 2. Di Pietro-Molva protocol.
5.2 Untraceability Under Ideal Assumptions
We show that under the following assumptions the Di Pietro-Molva protocol
indeed has the untraceability property with respect to RFID tags. We assume
that the random numbers used in the protocol are perfect nonces, we restrict
the number q of nonces used by the tag in the protocol to one, and we treat the
DPM function appearing in V as a perfect hash function.
Theorem 2. If the DPM function is a perfect hash function then the protocol
depicted in Figure 2 is untraceable for q = 1.
Proof. It can be easily verified with automated tools that kT,R and r1 are secret.
Let t be a trace with subtraces tTi and t
T
j for i 6= j. We proceed similarly to the
proof of Theorem 1, and set agent(tTi ) = agent(t
T
j ) = agent(t
′T
i ) = Alice and
agent(t′Tj ) = Bob.
Let tTj contain the event where α1#θ, V#θ, ω#θ is sent. We consider the
map π which for any term R has the following properties
π(h(kAlice,R, nj#θ, r1#θ, kAlice,R)) = h(kBob,R, nj#θ, r1#θ, kBob,R)
π(h(kAlice,R, r1#θ, kAlice,R)) = h(kBob,R, r1#θ, kBob,R)
π(h(kAlice, IDR, kAlice)) = h(kBob, IDR, kBob)
and is equal to the identity map everywhere else. Note that according to the
specification, kAlice,R = h(kAlice, IDR, kAlice) and α1#θ = kAlice,R ⊕ r1#θ. By
the definition of reinterpretation, π(kAlice,R ⊕ r1#θ) = π(kAlice,R)⊕ π(r1#θ) =
kBob,R ⊕ r1#θ. For convenience, we set α
′
1#θ = kBob,R ⊕ r1#θ.
Let t′ = π(t). It follows from the construction that the map produces a valid
run for Bob while keeping the reader’s run valid. The only differences between the
traces t and t′ occur in messages containing the hashes h(kBob,R, r1#θ, kBob,R)
and h(kBob,R, nj#θ, r1#θ, kBob,R). Aside from Bob’s run, the hashes and α1#θ
may be replayed by the adversary. Because r1#θ is generated by T#θ, no other
run of T will accept h(kBob,R, r1#θ, kBob,R) or h(kAlice,R, r1#θ, kAlice,R). Simi-
larly, since kT,R is secret and at most one run of R could have generated nj#θ,
at most one run of R accepts α1#θ, α
′
1#θ, h(kBob,R, nj#θ, r1#θ, kBob,R), and
h(kAlice,R, nj#θ, r1#θ, kAlice,R).
Finally, tTi = t
′T
i , since r1#θ is generated by T#θ, thus ¬L(t
′T
i , t
′T
j ).
It remains to show that π is a reinterpretation under the adversary’s knowl-
edge. This follows from the fact that r1#θ is secret. ⊓⊔
Note that the assumption q > 1 would invalidate the untraceability proof,
because t′ would not necessarily be a valid trace anymore. In fact, for q > 1 an
adversary may be able to determine that a tag is not identical to a previously
observed tag. This insight can be exploited with an active as well as a passive
attack. In an active attack, for each consecutive bit-triplet in α2, the adversary
would change one bit, during one execution. In such a case, the reader replies to
the tag with a third message if and only if the two unchanged bits of the cor-
responding bit-triplet of the nonce r2 are the same. Such an attack would, after
several iterations, lead to the same information as the passive attack demon-
strated in the following section.
5.3 Analysis of the DPM Function
We consider how much information about the tag is leaked through the DPM
function and the resulting relation between αi and V [i]. We first observe that
for (a, b, c), (x, y, z) ∈ F32,
M(a+ x, b, c) = ac+ bc+ ab+ cx+ bx
with analogous equations for M(a, b+ y, c) and M(a, b, c+ z). Furthermore, we
have
M(a+x, b+y, c+z) =M(a+x, b, c)+M(a, b+y, c)+M(a, b, c+z)+M(x, y, z).
It follows that
M(a+ x, b+ y, c+ z) = M(a, b, c) +M(x, y, z) + a(y + z) + b(x+ z) + c(x+ y)
which after reordering we write as
(y + z, x+ z, x+ y) ·


a
b
c

 = M(a+x, b+y, c+z)+M(a, b, c)+M(x, y, z). (1)
We define, for convenience, the function
cross : Fℓ2 → F
ℓ
2
(x1, y1, z1, . . . , xℓ/3, yℓ/3, zℓ/3) 7→ (y1 + z1, x1 + z1, x1 + y1, . . . ,
yℓ/3 + zℓ/3, xℓ/3 + zℓ/3, xℓ/3 + yℓ/3).
Note that cross(r1) + cross(r2) = cross(r1 + r2) = cross(α1 + α2).
From equation (1) and the definition of DPM(·) we obtain the following
identity in which the left-hand side is a product between the row vector cross(r1)
and kT,R written as a column vector k
T
T,R.
cross(r1) · k
T
T,R = DPM(kT,R + r1) +DPM(kT,R) +DPM(r1) (2)
and similarly
cross(r2) · k
T
T,R = DPM(kT,R + r2) +DPM(kT,R) +DPM(r2). (3)
By adding up equations (2) and (3) we obtain
cross(α1 + α2) · k
T
T,R = DPM(α1) +DPM(α2) +DPM(r1) +DPM(r2).
For i = 2, . . . , ℓ + 1, let the ℓ × ℓ matrix A be given by the row vectors
cross(α1 + αi) and let the column vector v be given by the entries DPM(α1) +
DPM(αi) +DPM(r1) +DPM(ri). Consider then the linear equation Ax = v,
viz.


cross(α1 + α2)
cross(α1 + α3)
...
cross(α1 + αℓ)

 · x =


DPM(α1) +DPM(α2) +DPM(r1) +DPM(r2)
DPM(α1) +DPM(α3) +DPM(r1) +DPM(r3)
...
DPM(α1) +DPM(αℓ) +DPM(r1) +DPM(rℓ)


By construction, the vector x = kTT,R is a solution of the equation and so is any
vector of the form kTT,R + y, where y is in the null space of A. Thus, the null
space of A in this equation can be considered the adversary’s uncertainty about
kT,R. From the definition of the cross(·) function, it is easy to see that the null
space of A contains the vectors
(1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0)T , (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0)T , . . . , (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1)T . (4)
The following theorem states that the null space of A is actually spanned
by these vectors whenever A is constructed from linearly independent vectors
α1, . . . , αℓ+1. Thus, the adversary can learn all bits of kT,R modulo the vectors
in (4), that is, up to complements of ℓ/3 consecutive bit-triplets.
Theorem 3. If α1, . . . , αℓ+1 are linearly independent, then the rank of A is
2
3ℓ.
Proof. We know that the ℓ/3 vectors listed in (4) are in the null space of A.
Since they are linearly independent, the rank of A is at most 23ℓ.
Conversely, consider the matrix A˜ obtained from A by deleting every third
column of A. A˜ can also be obtained from the matrix B consisting of the rows
α1 + α2, . . . , α1 + αℓ+1 as follows. We add every third column to the preceding
two columns and swap those preceding two columns. We call the resulting matrix
B˜. Clearly B and B˜ have the same rank. By deleting every third column of B˜,
we obtain A˜. Since deletion of a column decreases the rank of the matrix by at
most one and B˜ had full rank, it follows that the rank of A˜ is at least 23ℓ and
thus the rank of A is at least 23ℓ. ⊓⊔
5.4 Practical Considerations
The probability of a random (n + 1) × n matrix over F2 to have rank n is
greater than 1/2. This follows from a simple computation along the lines of
equation (1) in [44]. So we may over-estimate the expected number of random
vectors needed to obtain ℓ linearly independent vectors to be 2ℓ. Hence after
roughly 2ℓ/q communications between an adversary and a tag, the adversary
is able to compute a secret key of the tag up to complements of consecutive
bit-triplets. We will now show that this information is very likely to distinguish
one tag from almost all of the other tags in the system.
It follows from Theorem 3 that for each of the 2ℓ possible secret keys, there
are 2ℓ/3 possible keys which cannot be distinguished from it solely based on the
information contained in α1, . . . , αq and V . We may assume that the entries of
the secret keys are uniformly randomly distributed since they are obtained by
applying a cryptographic hash function. If we further assume that the number
of tags ν in the system is small compared to 2ℓ, then the probability that for a
given tag, there are one or more tags indistinguishable by the above method is
approximately 1− (1− 1
22ℓ/3
)ν . If, as suggested by the authors, we use the values
ℓ = 117, q = 2 log ν and assume that there are ν = 216 tags in the system, then
the probability to find one or more tags which would be indistinguishable from
a given tag is approximately 2.17 · 10−19 and the number of communications
necessary with the tag to be able to distinguish it with that probability would
be 10. In fact, even the probability that there are two or more indistinguishable
tags among 216 tags is vanishingly small, namely 7.1 · 10−13.
Finally, note that the same method reduces the complexity of computing the
secret key of a tag to a brute force search of a space with 2ℓ/3 elements, which
for ℓ = 117 is feasible.
5.5 Traceability
In this section we show that the Di Pietro-Molva protocol without idealizing
assumptions on the DPM function is traceable by our definition.
We say that the lookup process is efficient if any authorized reader can
uniquely identify a tag based on α1, . . . , αq and V .
Theorem 4. Assuming that the lookup process is efficient, the protocol depicted
in Figure 2 is traceable.
Proof. Let t be a trace in which a reader Ray interacts twice with the same tag
Alice. Let tT1 and t
T
2 be the two subtraces containing the send event of the tag,
i.e. agent(tT1 ) = agent(t
T
2 ) = Alice. We need to show that there is no valid trace
t′ ∼ t such that ¬L(t′T1 , t
′T
2 ).
By observing tT1 , t
T
2 the adversary can compute kAlice,Ray up to a null space
N1 as shown in Section 5.3. We may assume that t is such that N1 is the smallest
possible null space shown in (4). Note that no other key kT,Ray is equal to
kAlice,Ray + n for any n ∈ N1 because the lookup process is efficient.
Let t′ be any valid trace where agent(t′T1 ) = agent(t
T
1 ) = Alice, agent(t
′T
2 ) =
Bob. By construction, we have ¬L(t′T1 , t
′T
2 ).
By observing t′T2 , the adversary can compute kBob,Ray up to a null space
N2 with N1 ⊆ N2 by minimality of N1. There are no n1 ∈ N1, n2 ∈ N2 with
kAlice,Ray +n1 = kBob,Ray +n2 because the lookup process is efficient and N1 ⊆
N2.
Therefore the adversary can distinguish t from t′.
6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is a definition of untraceability which can
be used in formal verification of RFID protocols. We showed how to apply our
definition by proving that the protocol in [12] indeed satisfies untraceability. We
also demonstrated a weakness in the published protocol in [13], that we could
exploit by using linear algebra. We proved that the protocol does not satisfy our
definition of untraceability.
In the future, we would like to refine our notion of untraceability. Under the
current definition, for a tag to be untraceable, it suffices to find one other tag
which could have been present to produce the same trace. A strengthening of
this definition is therefore desirable.
Several other refinements are conceivable. One such refinement concerns a
weaker notion of untraceability that allows an adversary to recognize a tag be-
tween any two successful communications with a trusted RFID reader. Another
refinement could be ‘untraceability groups’ defining the set of agents from which
a particular agent cannot be distinguished. A third, slightly stronger notion of
untraceability that should be defined properly is the notion of ‘forward untrace-
ability’, stating that compromising a tag does not compromise its untraceability
in past interactions.
A difficult open problem concerns the condition π(f(m)) = f(π(m)) in the
definition of reinterpretation. This condition expresses that the application of
the function f can be reinterpreted only to the extent its arguments can be
reinterpreted under a given knowledge set M . If f is a cryptographic hash func-
tion, we know by the perfect cryptography assumption that f(m) can be freely
reinterpreted whenever m is not inferable from M . For other functions, how-
ever, the reinterpretation depends on the algebraic properties of f and then
π(f(m)) = f(π(m)) is only an under-approximation. Finding the correct condi-
tion for a given function f is, in general, non-trivial.
Finally, we plan to automate the process of verifying or finding attacks on
untraceability. This leads to new challenges as can be seen in Section 5.3. Under
the perfect cryptography assumption, large parts of the verification can be au-
tomated, but even state-of-the-art verification tools still struggle with algebraic
operations in security protocols.
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